Addresses 11 original findings (1 critical, 3 high, 4 medium, 3 low)
plus 4 additional findings from security review:
- Mask secrets in PUT /settings response (was leaking decrypted keys)
- Add paymentCheckoutRateLimit (10/hr/IP) to all 5 checkout endpoints
- Implement durable audit logging to payment_audit_log table
- Pin Stripe API version to 2026-01-28.clover (SDK v20.3.1)
- Add charge.dispute.created/closed webhook handlers with DISPUTED status
- Restore tickets on dispute won, handle charge_refunded closure
- Guard against sentinel passthrough corrupting stored Stripe keys
- Wrap refund DB updates in try/catch with webhook reconciliation fallback
- Add $transaction for product maxPurchases race condition
- Remove dead Payment model lookup from handleChargeRefunded
- Cap donation amount at $100k in both schemas
- Add requirePaymentsEnabled middleware on all checkout routes
- Remove Stripe internal IDs from CSV exports
- Add Cache-Control: no-store on admin settings responses
Bunker Admin
- Pin HS256 algorithm on all jwt.verify() calls (9 sites) and jwt.sign()
calls (3 sites) — prevents algorithm confusion attacks
- Add JWT_INVITE_SECRET env var; volunteer invite tokens now use a
dedicated key separate from access/refresh secrets
- Remove req.query.secret fallback from Listmonk webhook route — secrets
must not appear in nginx access logs
- Replace child_process.spawn in email template seed endpoint with direct
function import; add require.main guard to seed script
- Add sanitizeCsvField() to location CSV export to prevent formula
injection in Excel/Sheets (=, +, -, @ prefix → apostrophe prefix)
- Cap QR endpoint text input at 2000 chars to prevent DoS via large payloads
- Fix pre-existing TS errors: type participantNeeds as UpsertNeedsInput
in meeting-planner service; add sso field to UpdateResourcePayload
Bunker Admin
