7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
21208b58c7 feat(media): HLS adaptive bitrate streaming with MP4 fallback
Replaces single-MP4 + range-request streaming with HLS multi-bitrate
segments to fix video stutter through the Newt tunnel. Range-request
bursts were the root cause; HLS chunks are small and tunnel-friendly,
plus the player adapts bitrate to bandwidth.

Backend
- New BullMQ `hls-transcode` queue (in-process worker, concurrency 1)
- FFmpeg single-pass transcode → 360p/720p/1080p variants with aligned
  keyframes; output at /media/local/hls/{id}/master.m3u8
- New /api/{videos|public}/{id}/hls/* routes serving signed manifests
  and segments (URLs emitted as /media/* so nginx rewrites to media-api)
- Prisma: HlsStatus enum + 6 fields on Video + index, migration
- Upload + yt-dlp fetch paths enqueue transcode jobs
- ENABLE_HLS_TRANSCODE flag (default off; gates enqueue only)
- Backfill script: `npm run backfill:hls`
- media-api bumped to 4 CPU / 2G for FFmpeg headroom

Frontend
- New useHls hook: lazy-imports hls.js (kept out of main bundle),
  native HLS on Safari/iOS, gives up after 2 NETWORK_ERRORs so MP4
  fallback engages cleanly
- VideoPlayer, VideoViewerModal, ShortsPage, ProductDetailPage now
  prefer HLS when ready; MP4 fallback is automatic
- ShortsPage prefetches next-3 master manifests via <link rel="prefetch">
- PublicVideoCard hover preview stays MP4 (avoids hls.js init latency)

Bunker Admin
2026-04-30 19:03:29 -06:00
e55bc07eb6 Security hardening: red-team remediation + CCP/WIP updates
## Security (red-team audit 2026-04-12)

Public data exposure (P0):
- Public map converted to server-side heatmap, 2-decimal (~1.1km) bucketing,
  no addresses/support-levels/sign-info returned
- Petition signers endpoint strips displayName/signerComment/geoCity/geoCountry
- Petition public-stats drops recentSigners entirely
- Response wall strips userComment + submittedByName
- Campaign createdByUserEmail + moderation fields gated to SUPER_ADMIN

Access control (P1):
- Campaign findById/update/delete/email-stats enforce owner === req.user.id
  (SUPER_ADMIN bypasses), return 404 to avoid enumeration
- GPS tracking session route restricted to session owner or SUPER_ADMIN
- Canvass volunteer stats restricted to self or SUPER_ADMIN
- People household endpoints restricted to INFLUENCE + MAP roles (was ADMIN*)
- CCP upgrade.service.ts + certificate.service.ts gate user-controlled
  shell inputs (branch, path, slug, SAN hostname) behind regex validators

Token security (P2):
- Query-param JWT auth replaced with HMAC-signed short-lived URLs
  (utils/signed-url.ts + /api/media/sign endpoint); legacy ?token= removed
  from media streaming, photos, chat-notifications, and social SSE
- GITEA_SSO_SECRET + SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT now REQUIRED (min 32 chars);
  JWT_ACCESS_SECRET fallback removed — BREAKING for existing deployments
- Refresh tokens bound to device fingerprint (UA + /24 IP) via `df` JWT
  claim; mismatch revokes all user sessions
- Refresh expiry reduced 7d → 24h
- Refresh/logout via request body removed — httpOnly cookie only
- Password-reset + verification-resend rate limits now keyed on (IP, email)
  composite to prevent both IP rotation and email enumeration

Defense-in-depth (P3):
- DOMPurify sanitization applied to GrapesJS landing page HTML/CSS
- /api/health?detailed=true disk-space leak removed
- Password-reset/verification token log lines no longer include userId

## Deployment

- docker-compose.yml + docker-compose.prod.yml: media-api now receives
  GITEA_SSO_SECRET + SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT; empty fallbacks removed
- CCP templates/env.hbs adds both new secrets; refresh expiry → 24h
- CCP secret-generator.ts generates giteaSsoSecret + servicePasswordSalt
- leaflet.heat added to admin/package.json for heatmap rendering

## Operator action required on existing installs

Run `./config.sh` once (idempotent — only fills empty values) or manually
add GITEA_SSO_SECRET + SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT to .env via
`openssl rand -hex 32`. Startup fails with a clear Zod error otherwise.

See SECURITY_REDTEAM_2026-04-12.md for full audit and verification matrix.

## Other

Includes in-flight CCP work: instance schema tweaks, agent server updates,
health service, tunnel service, DEV_WORKFLOW doc updates, and new migration
dropping composeProject uniqueness.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-12 15:17:00 -06:00
1bf19fff0e Security audit: fix 30 findings across auth, IDOR, XSS, path traversal, infrastructure
Comprehensive 6-domain security audit addressing 8 Critical, 17 Important,
and 5 Low findings. Key fixes:

Critical:
- Strip PII from unauthenticated ticket lookup (IDOR)
- Add role+permission checks to event check-in routes
- Validate tier-to-event ownership on update/delete (IDOR)
- Fix path traversal in video replace (resolve + prefix check)
- Enable MongoDB authentication for Rocket.Chat
- Disable Grafana anonymous access
- Sanitize CSV exports against formula injection (payments)
- Apply DOMPurify to richDescription on public event page (XSS)

Important:
- Require current password for self-service password changes
- Atomic password reset token consumption (race condition fix)
- Scope postMessage to specific origin (not wildcard)
- Validate redirect parameter against open redirect
- Replace weak temp passwords (5760 values → crypto.randomBytes)
- Move shift capacity check inside transaction (TOCTOU fix)
- Fix EVENTS_ADMIN privilege inversion in ticketed events
- Make ENCRYPTION_KEY required (remove optional fallback)
- Add internal Prometheus metrics endpoint for Docker scraping
- Add nginx-level rate limiting (limit_req_zone)
- Fix X-Forwarded-For to use $remote_addr (prevents spoofing)
- Replace CSP stripping with frame-ancestors in embed proxies
- Remove error.message from Fastify 500 responses
- Strip PII from volunteer canvass address data
- Wrap GrapesJS output in {% raw %} to prevent Jinja2 SSTI
- Scope SSE token query param to /sse path only
- Sanitize Listmonk email query against injection

Bunker Admin
2026-03-27 08:47:24 -06:00
647efffdc4 Security hardening: JWT algorithm pinning, key separation, injection fixes
- Pin HS256 algorithm on all jwt.verify() calls (9 sites) and jwt.sign()
  calls (3 sites) — prevents algorithm confusion attacks
- Add JWT_INVITE_SECRET env var; volunteer invite tokens now use a
  dedicated key separate from access/refresh secrets
- Remove req.query.secret fallback from Listmonk webhook route — secrets
  must not appear in nginx access logs
- Replace child_process.spawn in email template seed endpoint with direct
  function import; add require.main guard to seed script
- Add sanitizeCsvField() to location CSV export to prevent formula
  injection in Excel/Sheets (=, +, -, @ prefix → apostrophe prefix)
- Cap QR endpoint text input at 2000 chars to prevent DoS via large payloads
- Fix pre-existing TS errors: type participantNeeds as UpsertNeedsInput
  in meeting-planner service; add sso field to UpdateResourcePayload

Bunker Admin
2026-03-22 12:35:04 -06:00
76b87d9f3d Tonne of things 2026-03-08 18:11:26 -06:00
a7978de5a0 Bunch of stuff again 2026-02-16 18:48:54 -07:00
7895ce683e Tonne of debugging - getting ready for the production builds 2026-02-16 10:44:18 -07:00