41 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
5115c65691 Fix nginx/newt boot race by raising API healthcheck start_period to 120s
On a fresh install, the api container's docker-entrypoint.sh does
migrations + seed + MaxMind GeoLite2 download synchronously before
binding port 4000, which routinely exceeds the previous 75s tolerance
(start_period 30s + 3x15s retries). When the API flipped to unhealthy,
nginx and newt (which depend on api: condition: service_healthy)
aborted, leaving the tunnel offline and requiring a manual
'docker compose up -d nginx newt' second pass.

Bumping start_period to 120s gives first-boot enough slack, matches
convention (Rocket.Chat 90s, Gancio 60s), and leaves steady-state
restarts unaffected. Change applied to both dev (docker-compose.yml)
and prod (docker-compose.prod.yml) since the release tarball ships
the latter.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-15 10:05:20 -06:00
e55bc07eb6 Security hardening: red-team remediation + CCP/WIP updates
## Security (red-team audit 2026-04-12)

Public data exposure (P0):
- Public map converted to server-side heatmap, 2-decimal (~1.1km) bucketing,
  no addresses/support-levels/sign-info returned
- Petition signers endpoint strips displayName/signerComment/geoCity/geoCountry
- Petition public-stats drops recentSigners entirely
- Response wall strips userComment + submittedByName
- Campaign createdByUserEmail + moderation fields gated to SUPER_ADMIN

Access control (P1):
- Campaign findById/update/delete/email-stats enforce owner === req.user.id
  (SUPER_ADMIN bypasses), return 404 to avoid enumeration
- GPS tracking session route restricted to session owner or SUPER_ADMIN
- Canvass volunteer stats restricted to self or SUPER_ADMIN
- People household endpoints restricted to INFLUENCE + MAP roles (was ADMIN*)
- CCP upgrade.service.ts + certificate.service.ts gate user-controlled
  shell inputs (branch, path, slug, SAN hostname) behind regex validators

Token security (P2):
- Query-param JWT auth replaced with HMAC-signed short-lived URLs
  (utils/signed-url.ts + /api/media/sign endpoint); legacy ?token= removed
  from media streaming, photos, chat-notifications, and social SSE
- GITEA_SSO_SECRET + SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT now REQUIRED (min 32 chars);
  JWT_ACCESS_SECRET fallback removed — BREAKING for existing deployments
- Refresh tokens bound to device fingerprint (UA + /24 IP) via `df` JWT
  claim; mismatch revokes all user sessions
- Refresh expiry reduced 7d → 24h
- Refresh/logout via request body removed — httpOnly cookie only
- Password-reset + verification-resend rate limits now keyed on (IP, email)
  composite to prevent both IP rotation and email enumeration

Defense-in-depth (P3):
- DOMPurify sanitization applied to GrapesJS landing page HTML/CSS
- /api/health?detailed=true disk-space leak removed
- Password-reset/verification token log lines no longer include userId

## Deployment

- docker-compose.yml + docker-compose.prod.yml: media-api now receives
  GITEA_SSO_SECRET + SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT; empty fallbacks removed
- CCP templates/env.hbs adds both new secrets; refresh expiry → 24h
- CCP secret-generator.ts generates giteaSsoSecret + servicePasswordSalt
- leaflet.heat added to admin/package.json for heatmap rendering

## Operator action required on existing installs

Run `./config.sh` once (idempotent — only fills empty values) or manually
add GITEA_SSO_SECRET + SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT to .env via
`openssl rand -hex 32`. Startup fails with a clear Zod error otherwise.

See SECURITY_REDTEAM_2026-04-12.md for full audit and verification matrix.

## Other

Includes in-flight CCP work: instance schema tweaks, agent server updates,
health service, tunnel service, DEV_WORKFLOW doc updates, and new migration
dropping composeProject uniqueness.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-12 15:17:00 -06:00
df65b1b72e Add documents volume mount + harden compose health checks
Mount ${MEDIA_ROOT}/local/documents:/media/local/documents:rw on the
media-api service so the document upload route can write PDFs to
disk. Without this mount, uploads fail on fresh deployments.

Also hardens several depends_on entries from service_started to
service_healthy (redis for media-api, api for admin, listmonk-app
for listmonk-init, gitea-db for gitea, nginx for newt) so
containers wait for actual readiness, not just process start.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-11 21:05:01 -06:00
5f0ae6bc5a Revert NocoDB auto sign-in, keep CSP fix for embed proxy
NocoDB v2 stores auth tokens in-memory (Pinia store), not in cookies
accessible to external pages. The auth bridge approach can't inject
tokens into NocoDB's SPA state. Reverted to the original banner
approach ("sign in to NocoDB in a new tab").

Kept: CSP fix (frame-ancestors http://localhost:* instead of just
localhost, which only matched port 80).

Bunker Admin
2026-04-09 14:01:02 -06:00
c180bb5ace Rework Gitea init to use separate init container pattern
The previous approach (custom CMD on gitea-app) failed because:
- Gitea's entrypoint generates app.ini as root, then drops to git user
- Overriding CMD ran our script before app.ini was generated
- su-exec to git user lost access to the entrypoint-generated config

Now uses the same pattern as nocodb-init: a separate container that
depends on gitea-app being healthy, shares the gitea-data volume
(which has app.ini), and runs gitea admin user create.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-09 13:25:56 -06:00
36b709b911 Automate Gitea init, NocoDB auto sign-in, and fix prod compose
- Add scripts/gitea-init.sh: runs migrations + creates admin user on
  first boot, replacing the manual installation wizard
- Set GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true in both compose files
- Add NocoDB auth bridge (nginx) + /api/services/nocodb-auth proxy
  endpoint so the admin iframe auto-authenticates
- Update NocoDBPage.tsx to fetch token and use auth bridge flow
- Fix docker-compose.prod.yml missing Gitea env vars for API container
  (GITEA_URL, GITEA_API_TOKEN, GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD, etc.)
- Pass NC_ADMIN_EMAIL/PASSWORD to API for NocoDB auth proxy
- Increase Gitea auto-setup retries from 3 to 6 with admin auth check
- Update config.sh non-interactive mode to set GITEA_ADMIN_USER
- Include gitea-init.sh in release tarball (build-release.sh)

Bunker Admin
2026-04-09 12:49:33 -06:00
849dea7ce2 Fix config.sh Pangolin setup and MongoDB init for fresh deployments
- Fix Pangolin endpoint: ask separately from API URL (different hostnames)
- Add pangolin_create_resources() to create resources + targets during setup
- Set all resources as public (no SSO/blockAccess) automatically
- Fix API health check URL to use actual org endpoint
- Fix MongoDB entrypoint: delegate to docker-entrypoint.sh so INITDB user
  creation works on fresh volumes (was bypassing Docker's init sequence)

Bunker Admin
2026-04-09 11:43:13 -06:00
72dbd0189c Pass GITEA_SSO_SECRET and SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT to API container
These env vars were defined in .env but never mapped into the API
container's environment block, causing silent fallback to
JWT_ACCESS_SECRET and security warnings on startup.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-09 09:26:51 -06:00
c6f8a49925 Add CCP registration page to CML admin panel
Operators can now register with a Control Panel directly from the admin
GUI (Services → Control Panel) without SSH access. Uses the existing
updateEnvFile + dockerService pattern from the Pangolin setup.

New endpoint: /api/ccp-registration (status, register, unregister)
New page: ControlPanelPage with form for CCP URL, invite code, agent URL
Also passes CCP env vars through docker-compose to the API container.

Bunker Admin
2026-04-08 15:13:28 -06:00
38ccaa8a5b Add remote instance management with mTLS agent and phone-home registration
Enables the CCP to manage CML instances on remote servers via a lightweight
HTTP agent. Key components:

- ExecutionDriver abstraction (local-driver.ts / remote-driver.ts) routes
  operations to local Docker or remote agent transparently
- Remote agent package (agent/) with mTLS authentication, Docker Compose
  operations, file management, backup/upgrade delegation
- Certificate service using openssl CLI for CA management and cert issuance
- Phone-home registration: remote agents register via invite code, CCP admin
  approves, agent receives mTLS cert bundle automatically
- config.sh integration with configure_control_panel() section
- ccp-agent Docker Compose service (profile-gated)
- Frontend: AgentRegistrationsPage, InviteCodesPage, Remote Agents sidebar menu
- Security hardened: cert bundle wiped after delivery, shell injection prevention
  via execFile, command allowlist with metachar rejection, rate-limited public
  endpoints, auto-populated fingerprint pinning

Also wires ENABLE_SOCIAL/PEOPLE/ANALYTICS through env.ts, seed.ts, and
docker-compose env passthrough (from previous session).

Bunker Admin
2026-04-07 15:24:33 -06:00
530551f568 Fix deployment issues found during end-to-end testing
- install.sh: Use tar --strip-components=1 instead of mv for robust
  extraction when install dir partially exists (root-owned Docker
  artifacts)
- config.sh: Add --non-interactive mode (--domain, --admin-password,
  --enable-all flags) for CI/CD and automated deployments
- docker-entrypoint.sh: Validate critical env vars on startup, fail
  early with clear messages instead of silent failures
- docker-compose.yml: Change Redis eviction policy from allkeys-lru
  to noeviction (required by BullMQ job queues)
- Prisma: Add missing petitions.coverVideoId migration (schema had
  the column but migration omitted it, causing 500 on public endpoint)
- Add scripts/uninstall.sh for clean removal including root-owned files
- Add scripts/test-deployment.sh for automated post-install verification

Bunker Admin
2026-04-07 14:06:05 -06:00
08bd1f92b0 Add unified analytics system with GeoIP geo-tracking
Full analytics platform with MaxMind GeoLite2 IP-to-location resolution,
cross-module dashboard (docs, video, photo), user drill-down, volunteer
self-service stats, and ANALYTICS_ADMIN role with feature flag controls.

- ANALYTICS_ADMIN role + ANALYTICS_ROLES group across backend and frontend
- GeoIP service (MaxMind GeoLite2, lazy-loaded, graceful degradation)
- Geo fields (country, region, city, lat/lng) on DocsPageView, VideoView, PhotoView
- IP resolved to geo before SHA-256 hashing (privacy-preserving)
- Unified analytics module: overview, geo, content, user engagement endpoints
- 4 admin dashboard pages: Overview, Geography (Leaflet map), Content, Users
- Volunteer MyAnalyticsPage for self-service activity stats
- Settings UI: enableAnalytics, analyticsGeoEnabled, trackAuthenticatedUsers, retentionDays
- Scheduled cleanup job respecting configurable retention period
- config.sh: Analytics + MaxMind prompt in configure_features()
- Control panel: enableAnalytics flag, template, discovery, wizard, detail page
- Docker: geoip volume mount, MaxMind env vars, entrypoint auto-download
- Nginx: X-Forwarded-For fix ($proxy_add_x_forwarded_for) for real client IP
- Express trust proxy set to 2 for Pangolin/Newt tunnel chain
- CORS updated for docs origin (cmlite.org + docs.cmlite.org)
- Lander page: added docs-analytics tracking snippet
- Prisma migration: 20260402100000_add_analytics_system

Bunker Admin
2026-04-03 08:47:44 -06:00
5a0c4641a1 Security audit fixes, mobile responsiveness across 40+ admin pages
Security hardening from Mar 31 audit:
- Separate login rate limit (10/15min) from general auth budget (15/15min)
- Timing-safe webhook secret comparison (Listmonk)
- Docs file creation ACL check (matches PUT/DELETE guards)
- Key separation warnings for GITEA_SSO_SECRET and SERVICE_PASSWORD_SALT
- Clear GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD from .env after auto-setup
- SQL injection prevention in effectiveness groupBy (pre-validated map)
- Token hashing for password reset and verification tokens

Mobile responsiveness (Phase 2C):
- Add MobilePageHeader component and useMobile hook
- Responsive table columns (hide secondary cols on mobile)
- scroll={{ x: 'max-content' }} across all data tables
- Mobile-adapted layouts for Dashboard, Settings, Calendar, SMS, Social pages
- Conditional toolbar buttons on mobile viewports

Infrastructure:
- Updated docker-compose and nginx templates
- Build script and mirror script updates

Bunker Admin
2026-03-31 18:30:17 -06:00
0c2ffe754e Harden Stripe payment integration: 15 security fixes from audit
Addresses 11 original findings (1 critical, 3 high, 4 medium, 3 low)
plus 4 additional findings from security review:

- Mask secrets in PUT /settings response (was leaking decrypted keys)
- Add paymentCheckoutRateLimit (10/hr/IP) to all 5 checkout endpoints
- Implement durable audit logging to payment_audit_log table
- Pin Stripe API version to 2026-01-28.clover (SDK v20.3.1)
- Add charge.dispute.created/closed webhook handlers with DISPUTED status
- Restore tickets on dispute won, handle charge_refunded closure
- Guard against sentinel passthrough corrupting stored Stripe keys
- Wrap refund DB updates in try/catch with webhook reconciliation fallback
- Add $transaction for product maxPurchases race condition
- Remove dead Payment model lookup from handleChargeRefunded
- Cap donation amount at $100k in both schemas
- Add requirePaymentsEnabled middleware on all checkout routes
- Remove Stripe internal IDs from CSV exports
- Add Cache-Control: no-store on admin settings responses

Bunker Admin
2026-03-31 08:34:23 -06:00
8b9ab93856 Add docs CMS: blog authoring, access policies, sharing, version history, templates, metadata, search, Gitea auto-setup
7 documentation system features:
- Blog authoring: frontmatter panel, new post wizard, authors management
- Access policies: per-file/directory edit restrictions with role/user granularity
- Public sharing: share links with collaborative editing via dual JWT auth
- Version history: Gitea auto-commit on save, diff viewer, restore
- Document templates: 8 built-in templates (blog, guide, API ref, ADR, FAQ, etc.)
- Metadata dashboard: overview of all docs with warnings (no-tags, stale, etc.)
- Content search: in-file text search with line-level matches

Gitea auto-setup: one-click configuration of API token, repos, labels, OAuth app
- Backend service + startup hook (auto-configures if GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD set)
- Admin GUI wizard at /app/services/gitea/setup
- config.sh now prompts for Gitea admin password

Backend: 10 new files, 5 modified (3 models, 1 enum, 2 migrations, 30+ API endpoints)
Frontend: 13 new files, 3 modified (hooks, components, pages)

Bunker Admin
2026-03-27 13:28:52 -06:00
b215cda018 Security audit follow-up: httpOnly cookies, ticket reservations, MongoDB keyfile
Deferred findings from the March 27 security audit, plus a bug fix:

MongoDB keyfile (bug fix):
- Generate replica.key on first boot via entrypoint script
- Fixes crash from --auth + --keyFile without an existing keyfile
- Applied to docker-compose.yml, docker-compose.prod.yml, CCP template

I7 — Ticket overselling prevention (reservation pattern):
- Add reservedCount field to TicketTier schema
- Atomically increment reservedCount inside transaction on checkout
- Release reservation on checkout.session.completed (webhook)
- Release reservation on checkout.session.expired (webhook)
- Include reservedCount in availability calculations

I17 — Move refresh token to httpOnly cookie:
- Server sets httpOnly SameSite=Strict cookie on login/register/refresh
- Cookie scoped to /api/auth path, secure in production
- Refresh/logout endpoints read from cookie (with body fallback for compat)
- Frontend no longer stores refreshToken in localStorage
- Auth store simplified: removed refreshToken from state + persistence
- API interceptor uses withCredentials:true for automatic cookie sending
- Updated media-api, media-public-api, QuickJoinPage, volunteer-invite
- Renamed getTokens → getAccessToken across all media components
- Install cookie-parser middleware

L2 — FeatureGate loading state:
- Show Skeleton instead of children while settings are loading
- Prevents briefly exposing disabled feature pages

Bunker Admin
2026-03-27 09:20:26 -06:00
1bf19fff0e Security audit: fix 30 findings across auth, IDOR, XSS, path traversal, infrastructure
Comprehensive 6-domain security audit addressing 8 Critical, 17 Important,
and 5 Low findings. Key fixes:

Critical:
- Strip PII from unauthenticated ticket lookup (IDOR)
- Add role+permission checks to event check-in routes
- Validate tier-to-event ownership on update/delete (IDOR)
- Fix path traversal in video replace (resolve + prefix check)
- Enable MongoDB authentication for Rocket.Chat
- Disable Grafana anonymous access
- Sanitize CSV exports against formula injection (payments)
- Apply DOMPurify to richDescription on public event page (XSS)

Important:
- Require current password for self-service password changes
- Atomic password reset token consumption (race condition fix)
- Scope postMessage to specific origin (not wildcard)
- Validate redirect parameter against open redirect
- Replace weak temp passwords (5760 values → crypto.randomBytes)
- Move shift capacity check inside transaction (TOCTOU fix)
- Fix EVENTS_ADMIN privilege inversion in ticketed events
- Make ENCRYPTION_KEY required (remove optional fallback)
- Add internal Prometheus metrics endpoint for Docker scraping
- Add nginx-level rate limiting (limit_req_zone)
- Fix X-Forwarded-For to use $remote_addr (prevents spoofing)
- Replace CSP stripping with frame-ancestors in embed proxies
- Remove error.message from Fastify 500 responses
- Strip PII from volunteer canvass address data
- Wrap GrapesJS output in {% raw %} to prevent Jinja2 SSTI
- Scope SSE token query param to /sse path only
- Sanitize Listmonk email query against injection

Bunker Admin
2026-03-27 08:47:24 -06:00
39d74e7b85 Add guided tour, media enhancements, error handling, and DevOps improvements
Major additions: onboarding tour system, correlation-id middleware, media
error handler, restore script, env validation script, Dockerignore files.
Updates across 70+ admin components for improved UX and error handling.

Bunker Admin
2026-03-26 10:31:51 -06:00
0c634e100f Replace custom code-server (9GB) with upstream LinuxServer image (~1GB)
Drop the custom Dockerfile.code-server that bundled Claude Code CLI,
Python/MkDocs tooling, and build-essential on top of codercom base.
Switch to the already-mirrored linuxserver/code-server image instead.

- Both compose files: use code-server:latest, LinuxServer env vars
  (PUID/PGID/DEFAULT_WORKSPACE), port 8443, /config mount layout
- Nginx configs + templates: proxy to :8443 instead of :8080
- API env default: CODE_SERVER_URL updated to :8443
- build-and-push.sh: remove --include-code-server flag
- upgrade.sh: remove code-server conditional rebuild + registry fallback
- install.sh: add --ignore-pull-failures for optional missing images
- .env.example, CCP templates, bunker-ops template: updated

Bunker Admin
2026-03-25 20:10:36 -06:00
7287328148 Harden install pipeline: health checks, log rotation, backup timer
- install.sh: Add Docker daemon check, 10GB disk space pre-flight,
  error handling on pull/up, post-startup health polling with crash
  detection, cleanup trap on failure
- docker-compose: Fix nginx/listmonk depends_on to service_healthy,
  add x-logging anchor (10m/3 files) to all ~39 services
- config.sh: Preserve existing secrets on re-run (reconfigure mode),
  add automated daily backup timer (systemd, 02:00, 30-day retention)
- mirror-images.sh: Fix gotify source tag (2.9.0 not v2.9.0)
- build-release.sh: Ensure mkdocs/docs and mkdocs/overrides dirs exist
- .env.example: Add COMPOSE_PROFILES variable

Bunker Admin
2026-03-25 19:33:11 -06:00
3262d92065 Remove hardcoded container names for multi-instance deployment support
- Dashboard: auto-discovers containers from Docker network via socket
  proxy API instead of hardcoded 30-name list. Labels derived from
  docker compose service metadata.
- Email/Settings: mailhog host read from env.SMTP_HOST instead of
  hardcoded 'mailhog-changemaker' string
- Pangolin: grafana container derived from env.GRAFANA_URL hostname;
  newt container/service names from NEWT_CONTAINER_NAME/NEWT_COMPOSE_SERVICE
- SSRF blocklist: built dynamically from all service URL env vars
  instead of hardcoded hostname list
- New env vars: DOCKER_NETWORK_NAME, DOCKER_PROXY_URL,
  NEWT_CONTAINER_NAME, NEWT_COMPOSE_SERVICE

Bunker Admin
2026-03-25 17:35:05 -06:00
abdfd50cb8 Make embed proxy ports configurable via env vars for multi-instance deployments
All 13 nginx embed proxy ports (8881-8895) are now driven by environment
variables instead of being hardcoded. This prevents port conflicts when
running multiple Changemaker instances on the same host.

Chain: .env → docker-compose port mappings → nginx container env →
entrypoint.sh envsubst → services.conf.template listen directives →
API /services/config endpoint → frontend buildServiceUrl().

Existing deployments are unaffected (all vars default to current values).

Bunker Admin
2026-03-25 15:25:00 -06:00
be2fa5d80b Fix media-api restart loop and add registry build scripts
- Fix @/utils/logger path alias (tsc doesn't transform @/ in output)
- Add JWT_INVITE_SECRET to media-api compose environment block
- Fix redis-exporter depends_on to use service name not container name
- Fix upgrade.sh: restore tracked files deleted by restore_user_paths
- Add scripts/build-and-push.sh for building + pushing production images
- Add scripts/mirror-images.sh for mirroring third-party images

Bunker Admin
2026-03-22 19:17:10 -06:00
e6e324262f Add JWT_INVITE_SECRET to API container environment
docker-compose.yml explicitly enumerates each env var passed to
containers, so the new JWT_INVITE_SECRET needed to be wired through
the environment block or the API would fail Zod env validation at
startup.

Bunker Admin
2026-03-22 12:40:34 -06:00
b136396f3b Fix excalidraw image: switch to official excalidraw/excalidraw:latest
kiliandeca/excalidraw:sha-e42a510 tag doesn't exist. The kiliandeca fork
hasn't been updated since 2021. Official image is current (Jan 2026).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-09 16:36:34 -06:00
e0507e1f25 Fix docker-socket-proxy image tag: 0.4.2 → v0.4.2
The tag on Docker Hub requires the 'v' prefix, causing pull failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-09 16:27:36 -06:00
533783bcae Mkdocs search fixers 2026-03-09 16:05:25 -06:00
c192c04c79 Security audit: fix 25 findings across API, nginx, and Docker
Addresses data exposure, access control, input validation, infrastructure
hardening, and supply chain security issues identified during audit.

Key changes:
- Strip internal fields from public campaign/profile/comment endpoints
- Restrict docs routes to CONTENT_ROLES, provisioning to SUPER_ADMIN
- Add SSE connection limits, social middleware fail-closed behavior
- Bind all non-nginx ports to 127.0.0.1, pin container image versions
- Add CSP header, conditional HSTS, token redaction in nginx logs
- Validate nav URLs, calendar schemas, video tracking batch events
- Reject default admin password placeholder, add SSRF protocol checks
- Exclude .env from Code Server, enforce RC admin password in compose
- Add Zod validation for achievement grant/revoke, webhook secret header
- Fix path traversal prefix attack, add calendar token expiry

Bunker Admin
2026-03-09 14:13:37 -06:00
76b87d9f3d Tonne of things 2026-03-08 18:11:26 -06:00
eba6453981 Merge branch 'v2' of https://gitea.bnkops.com/admin/changemaker.lite into v2 2026-03-07 13:10:12 -07:00
e7890b0be1 Add admin user creation to gancio-init container
The gancio-init container only seeded default color palettes but never
created an admin user, causing the settings sync to silently fail on
every API startup. Now creates an admin user via pgcrypto bcrypt hashing
using GANCIO_ADMIN_USER/GANCIO_ADMIN_PASSWORD env vars, with
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING for idempotency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-05 12:20:19 -07:00
a37d9910af Add nocodb-init container for automatic database registration
Follows the listmonk-init pattern: an alpine:3 container that runs once
after NocoDB is healthy, calls the REST API to register changemaker_v2
as a browsable data source, and exits. Idempotent — exits immediately
if the base already has tables, and guards against duplicate sources
during async table discovery.

Bunker Admin
2026-03-05 10:59:39 -07:00
da3e43fcf7 Add browser-based system upgrade UI with file-based IPC
API container writes trigger files to a shared volume (data/upgrade/),
and a systemd path watcher on the host detects them and runs the
upgrade scripts. This avoids giving the container Docker socket access.

- Add upgrade-check.sh (git fetch + compare + write status.json)
- Add upgrade-watcher.sh (systemd bridge, dispatches check/upgrade)
- Add systemd path/service units with placeholder substitution
- Modify upgrade.sh with --api-mode flag (progress.json + result.json)
- Add API upgrade module (service + routes, SUPER_ADMIN only)
- Add System tab to Settings page with version info, changelog,
  progress steps, and upgrade confirmation modal
- Add upgrade watcher installation to config.sh wizard
- Add data/upgrade/ shared volume to api service in docker-compose

Bunker Admin
2026-03-03 18:00:15 -07:00
9e51aac570 Okay Wish I could say I know exactly. Will do better next time promise lol 2026-02-26 17:47:04 -07:00
7352815e57 More control panel updates 2026-02-21 11:46:55 -07:00
435fb8150c A whole bunch of stuff agian lol I promise to track more closely when we get to more stable state - like end of feb 2026-02-19 09:41:27 -07:00
1a1f12c45b Tonne of updates 2026-02-18 17:15:31 -07:00
56e262ad8b Tonne of udpatess 2026-02-18 10:01:54 -07:00
99a6abab06 Add video card insert feature + MkDocs video hydration + fixes
- New video card block for GrapesJS landing pages, email templates,
  MkDocs export, and documentation editor Insert dropdown
- Shared HTML generators in admin/src/utils/videoCardHtml.ts
- MkDocs video-player.js hydrates .video-card-block elements:
  thumbnail fix via MEDIA_API_URL, click-to-play inline, Gallery link
- Media API CORS: auto-add MkDocs + docs subdomain origins
- env_config_hook.py: smart Docker hostname detection, ADMIN_PORT
  resolution, pass env vars to MkDocs container
- Gallery URL uses /gallery?expanded=ID format
- VideoPickerModal: fix double /api prefix and Docker hostname thumbs
- Seed: default-video-card PageBlock
- Remove V1 legacy code (influence/, map/)

Bunker Admin
2026-02-17 15:42:32 -07:00
7895ce683e Tonne of debugging - getting ready for the production builds 2026-02-16 10:44:18 -07:00
a77306fac2 Initial v2 commit: complete rebuild with unified API + React admin
Phase 1-14 complete:
- Unified Express.js API (TypeScript, Prisma ORM, PostgreSQL 16)
- React Admin GUI (Vite + Ant Design + Zustand)
- JWT auth with refresh tokens
- Influence: Campaigns, Representatives, Responses, Email Queue
- Map: Locations, Cuts, Shifts, Canvassing System
- NAR data import infrastructure (2025 format)
- Listmonk newsletter integration
- Landing page builder (GrapesJS)
- MkDocs + Code Server integration
- Volunteer portal with GPS tracking
- Monitoring stack (Prometheus, Grafana, Alertmanager)
- Pangolin tunnel integration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-11 10:05:04 -07:00