bunker-admin
1bf19fff0e
Comprehensive 6-domain security audit addressing 8 Critical, 17 Important,
and 5 Low findings. Key fixes:
Critical:
- Strip PII from unauthenticated ticket lookup (IDOR)
- Add role+permission checks to event check-in routes
- Validate tier-to-event ownership on update/delete (IDOR)
- Fix path traversal in video replace (resolve + prefix check)
- Enable MongoDB authentication for Rocket.Chat
- Disable Grafana anonymous access
- Sanitize CSV exports against formula injection (payments)
- Apply DOMPurify to richDescription on public event page (XSS)
Important:
- Require current password for self-service password changes
- Atomic password reset token consumption (race condition fix)
- Scope postMessage to specific origin (not wildcard)
- Validate redirect parameter against open redirect
- Replace weak temp passwords (5760 values → crypto.randomBytes)
- Move shift capacity check inside transaction (TOCTOU fix)
- Fix EVENTS_ADMIN privilege inversion in ticketed events
- Make ENCRYPTION_KEY required (remove optional fallback)
- Add internal Prometheus metrics endpoint for Docker scraping
- Add nginx-level rate limiting (limit_req_zone)
- Fix X-Forwarded-For to use $remote_addr (prevents spoofing)
- Replace CSP stripping with frame-ancestors in embed proxies
- Remove error.message from Fastify 500 responses
- Strip PII from volunteer canvass address data
- Wrap GrapesJS output in {% raw %} to prevent Jinja2 SSTI
- Scope SSE token query param to /sse path only
- Sanitize Listmonk email query against injection
Bunker Admin
67 lines
2.4 KiB
Nginx Configuration File
67 lines
2.4 KiB
Nginx Configuration File
worker_processes auto;
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error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log warn;
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pid /var/run/nginx.pid;
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events {
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worker_connections 1024;
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}
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http {
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include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
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default_type application/octet-stream;
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# Redact sensitive query parameters (token, secret) from access logs
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map $request_uri $redacted_request {
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~^(?P<path>[^?]*)\?(?P<args>.*token=[^&]*) "$path?<token-redacted>";
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~^(?P<path>[^?]*)\?(?P<args>.*secret=[^&]*) "$path?<secret-redacted>";
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default $request_uri;
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}
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log_format main '$remote_addr - $remote_user [$time_local] "$request_method $redacted_request $server_protocol" '
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'$status $body_bytes_sent "$http_referer" '
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'"$http_user_agent" "$http_x_forwarded_for"';
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access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log main;
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server_tokens off;
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sendfile on;
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tcp_nopush on;
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tcp_nodelay on;
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keepalive_timeout 65;
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types_hash_max_size 2048;
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client_max_body_size 50m;
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# Rate limiting zones (defense-in-depth alongside app-level Redis rate limits)
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limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api_global:10m rate=30r/s;
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limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api_auth:10m rate=5r/s;
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limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=upload:10m rate=2r/s;
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limit_req_status 429;
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# Gzip compression
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gzip on;
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gzip_vary on;
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gzip_proxied any;
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gzip_comp_level 6;
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gzip_types text/plain text/css application/json application/javascript text/xml application/xml application/xml+rss text/javascript image/svg+xml;
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# Only send HSTS when the request arrived over HTTPS (via Pangolin tunnel)
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map $http_x_forwarded_proto $hsts_header {
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https "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains";
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default "";
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}
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# Security headers (applied globally — X-Frame-Options set per server block)
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
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add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
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add_header Strict-Transport-Security $hsts_header always;
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add_header Permissions-Policy "geolocation=(self), microphone=(), camera=()" always;
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# Docker internal DNS — enables runtime resolution so nginx starts
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# even when optional services are not running
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resolver 127.0.0.11 valid=30s;
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include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
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}
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